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Invited Article
In (Partial) Defense of .05
Thomas R. Knapp
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY

Researchers are frequently chided for choosing the .05 alpha level as the determiner of
statistical significance (or non-significance). A partial justification is provided.
Keywords:

.05 level, statistical significance, R. A. Fisher

Introduction
For the last 50 or 60 years it has been fashionable to deride the insistence on using
an alpha level of .05 for testing the statistical significance of a sample finding. It
is commonplace to read critical comments such as “The current obsession
with .05” (Skipper, Guenther, & Nass, 1967, p. 16; see also Labovitz, 1968) and
“God loves the .06 nearly as much as the .05” (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989, p.
1277). In the spirit of Robinson, Funk, Halbur, and O'Ryan (2003) I would like to
provide an explanation for ‘why .05?’ and an argument in favor of its prevailing
use. Near the end of the paper I will give a similar argument for 95% confidence
(.05's interval estimation counterpart), and I will conclude with a few cautionary
statements regarding total devotion to .05 and/or 95%.
A bit of history
Although there is some evidence for earlier recommendations of .05 as a
defensible level of statistical significance, most people claim that it was first
suggested by Fisher (1926):
[T]he evidence would have reached a point which may be called the
verge of significance; for it is convenient to draw the line at about the
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level at which we can say 'Either there is something in the treatment or
a coincidence has occurred such as does not occur more than once in
twenty trials.' This level, which we may call the 5 per cent level point,
would be indicated, though very roughly, by the greatest chance
deviation observed in twenty successive trials... If one in twenty does
not seem high enough odds, we may, if we prefer it, draw the line at
one in fifty (the 2 per cent point) or one in a hundred (the 1 per cent
point). Personally, the writer prefers to set the low standard of
significance at the 5 per cent point, and ignore entirely all results
which fail to reach this level. (p. 504)
There are several things to note about what Fisher said:
1.

2.

3.

He used the interesting phrase “the verge of significance”. As far as I
have been able to determine, none of his critics have commented
about that choice of words.
He did not insist on .05, as the second part of the quote indicated.
Many of his critics unfairly charged him with being unwavering
regarding .05.
Surprisingly, he confused probability with odds (and high with low).
The alpha level of .05 has to do with a probability of one in twenty;
the corresponding odds are one to nineteen (in favor) or nineteen to
one (against).

Fisher didn’t write about .05 being the probability of making a Type I error.
That concept (along with the probability of making a Type II error) was yet to
come in the Neyman-Pearson approach to hypothesis testing. Also yet to come
were several acrimonious arguments between Fisher and W. S. Gosset (who had
previously developed the t-test), between Fisher and Karl Pearson, and between
Fisher and both Jerzy Neyman and Egon Sharpe Pearson (Karl’s son), as
documented by Fienberg and Tanur (1966), Cowles and Davis (1982), Inman
(1994), Wainer and Robinson (2003), and others.
In the intervening years between 1926 and the present there were several
criticisms of .05, e.g., Cohen (1994), along with some defenders, e.g., Robinson,
et al. (2003). Cohen (1994) was particularly puzzling (see the collection of
comments regarding it in the December, 1995 issue of American Psychologist).
The title is difficult to understand. Was he trying to be clever in considering “The
earth is round” as a null hypothesis that should be rejected at the .05 level,
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because it is actually slightly elliptical rather than perfectly round? He also made
an error where he claimed many people believe a p-value is the probability that
the null hypothesis is false. No; some people mistakenly believe that a p-value is
the probability that the null hypothesis is true; no one believes p is the probability
of a false null.
After discussing some of the historical origins of the use of an alpha level
of .05, Robinson, et al. (2003) provided the results of empirical studies in which
students were asked how many heads in each of the first n flips of a coin would
lead them to claim that the coin was not “fair”. The modal response in most of
those studies was five. The probability of heads on the first five tosses of a fair
coin is .03125, which is close to the traditional .05 (see Figure 1 below).

A rationale for .05
Although Fisher didn't use the following argument, some of the students in the
Robinson, et al. (2003) studies apparently did, implicitly if not explicitly.
(Comparable arguments have been made by Tintle, et al., 2014 and at the
EMBstats website, http://www.embstats.com. See Figure 1 below for the latter.)
Suppose you were asked your opinion about the fairness of a coin. You want to
make a decision if its probability of landing as heads is equal to .5. How many
heads would have to be obtained in the first five tosses for you to call a halt and
conclude it’s not a fair coin? The probability of one head in one toss of a fair coin
is .5. (You wouldn’t call a halt.) The probability of two heads in two tosses
is .5 × .5 = .25, and the probability of three heads in three tosses
is .5 × .5 × .5 = .125. (Still no clear decision to halt.) The probability of four heads
in four tosses is .5 × .5 × .5 × .5 = .0625. (Perhaps the decision to halt is near, and
note .0625 is close to .05.) If you want to wait for the result of one more toss, the
probability of five heads in five tosses is .5 × .5 × .5 × .5 × .5 = .03125. At this
point you are likely to claim that the coin is not fair. (The difference
between .0625 and the .03125 is .046875, which is very close to .05.) However,
you know you might be wrong.
Figure 1 details the argument presented at the EMBstats website. Note the
interpretations of “Unusual” (for 4 heads in 4 tosses), “Surprising” (for 5 heads in
5 tosses), “Strange” (for 6 heads in 6 tosses), and “I don't believe it!” (for 7 heads
in 7 tosses). Fisher’s .05 would come between “Unusual” and “Surprising”. He
avoided the matter of proof and exhibited a commendable tolerance for
uncertainty. Similarly, statisticians are so comfortable with uncertainty that they
occasionally advocate the use of the randomized response technique for
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estimating a proportion where only some of the respondents to a survey actually
answer the question of interest (Campbell & Joiner, 1973).
Testing: Is my coin fair?
Formally: We want to make some inference about
P(head)
Try it: Toss coin several times (say 7 times). Assume
that it is fair (P(head) = 0.5), and see if this
assumption is compatible with the observations.
# tosses
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

# heads
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Comment
OK
OK
OK
Unusual
Surprising
Strange
I don't believe it!

Probability
0.50
0.25
0.12
0.06
0.03
0.02
0.01

Figure 1. EMBstats dialogue on tossing a coin (http://www.embstats.com).

95% confidence intervals
In the last 25 or 30 years there has been a pronounced shift from an emphasis on
significance testing to a preference for confidence intervals. Some methodologists
suggest reporting both; some journal editors require it. (Reporting both is not a
good idea. See the third statistics commandment in Knapp & Brown, 2014). But
the continuing choice of 95% for confidence (the interval estimation counterpart
to .05 for hypothesis testing) has not been subject to the same sort of scrutiny that
has been directed at .05. Why is that?
Perhaps consumers are more convinced by a 95% confidence argument than
by the .05 significance argument. Consider the coin-tossing problem above, but
change it to a desire for estimating the degree of bias associated with the coin
rather than testing its fairness. If the coin-tosser got five heads in five tosses and
was interested in estimating the population proportion of heads for that coin, he
could get a confidence interval by using Pezzullo’s online computing routine
(http://www.statpages.org) based on Clopper and Pearson’s (1934) formulas,
tables, and graphs.
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For example, at http://www.statpages.org for Exact Binomial Confidence
Intervals input 5 heads (the numerator) in 5 tosses (the denominator, chose 95%
confidence (the default). The results returned are 1.0000 as the statistic and .4782
to 1.0000 as the confidence interval. A choice of 99% confidence (corresponding
to .01 significance) or 99.9% confidence (corresponding to .001 significance)
serves only to reduce the lower limit (.3466 for 99% and .2187 for 99.9%) and
therefore provides more confidence. Could it be that some people regard 99%
confidence intervals and 99.9% confidence intervals to be too wide and are
willing to stick with 95% for its greater precision despite its lesser confidence?

Asterisks
Consider the still-common practice of labeling with a single asterisk a finding for
which p < .05, two asterisks for p < .01, and three asterisks for p < .001 (or what
Leahey, 2005 refers to as the three-star system”, Abstract). That is not sound
practice (see Slakter, Wu, & Suzuki-Slakter, 1991), because if an alpha of .05 has
been used in a power analysis to select an appropriate sample size, then all that is
necessary to determine is whether p is less than or greater than .05. (Similarly, for
alphas of .01 and .001.) Some journal editors require the reporting of the actual p,
and that is the preferred practice according to the American Psychological
Association manual (APA, 2010), which is not perfect, but is more sound than
using asterisks.
To be consistent, why aren’t asterisks or similar symbols used in the tables
where authors report 95%, 99%, or 99.9% confidence intervals? If this statistic is
significant at the .05 level and that statistic is significant at the .01 level, doesn’t it
make sense to put a 95% confidence interval around the first statistic and a 99%
confidence interval around the second statistic?
All of the references so far have been to journal articles. There are three
books on this topic that are recommended: Fisher (1925), Salsburg (2001), and
Moye (2006). These three authors addressed the choice of .05 for statistical
significance. Fisher (1925) contained some of the same views later expressed in
Fisher (1926). Salzburg related Fisher’s classic experiment regarding a lady’s
ability to determine whether milk has been added to tea or tea added to milk.
Moye provided a thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
p-values (mostly disadvantages). Both Salzburg and Moye gave fascinating
accounts of Fisher’s battles with Neyman and Pearson (and with Gosset). Moye
noted that Fisher was not wedded to .05, as stated above.
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Some cautions
Continuing to emphasize .05 as the cut-off between statistical significance and
non-significance is not all that bad. The same holds for continuing to emphasize
95% for confidence intervals. But there are exceptions.
1.

2.

3.

If there might be very serious consequences should a Type I error be
made, a more stringent alpha is necessary. For example, suppose a
randomized clinical trial (RCT) were to be carried out comparing the
effectiveness of a new and very expensive drug with an existing
much less expensive drug. Suppose further that a decision might be
made to reject the null hypothesis of no effect because of a
statistically significant effect in favor of the new drug, but in reality
it is no better. That could lead to the adoption of a drug that is not
only no better than the existing drug but could result in an
unnecessary cost of thousands or millions of dollars. In that case an
argument could be made to use .01 or .001 or an even smaller
significance level.
If the committing of a Type II error would have much greater
consequences than a Type I error, the argument is reversed; i.e.,
change alpha to a more liberal level, such as .20. An example of this
would be a medical diagnosis of no disease if a patient is in fact ill.
Generally, it would be worse to not treat a patient who has a disease
than to treat a patient when the disease is not present.
If the estimate of a population parameter must be both precise and
defendable, a confidence coefficient of 99.9% might be chosen, as
well as a huge sample size. For example, if an estimate of the
proportion of people who are below the poverty line is to be made,
we might want to do that in order to have both politically defensible
and morally desirable evidence for so doing.
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